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THE ROLE OF
THE CORPORATION

COUNSEL*

WILLIAM T. GossET-I-

I have suggested in these lectures that laws regulating the business
life of our country-and indeed of western civilization since medieval
times-almost always have come about in response to pressures. They
usually have arisen from specific events that in turn have focused attention on specific needs. "The life of the law is experience," said Mr.
Justice Holmes. Nowhere is this truer than in the area of laws touching upon our business and economic life.
There was no overwhelming doctrinal uprising in America that
overthrew the general theories of laissez-faire. The doctrine was overthrown by changes in the whole fabric of our national life, ranging
from technological innovations to vast political, economic and social
changes that could not possibly have been foreseen. Professor Goodhart of Oxford reminds us of the prophetic words of one great spokesman of the i8th Century: "We must all obey the great law of change,"
said Edmund Burke. "It is the most powerful law of nature and the
means perhaps of its conservation." 1
We could occupy ourselves here with some interesting theorizing
on this proposition. For example, there is the always interesting
question of the pace of the legislative process in the wise accommodation of laws to change; that is, whether laws sometimes are too precipitously enacted or too long delayed. Then there is the equally interesting, if not somewhat more precise, matter of the response to changes
reflected in judicial interpretation of existing law under new conditions; that is, whether there is too much devotion to the doctrine of
*The third lecture of the eighth annual John Randolph Tucker Lectures,
delivered by Mr. Gossett before the School of Law of Washington and Lee University
on May ii and 12, 1956. The complete Lectures will be published in book form
at a later date.
-General Counsel, Ford Motor Company.
'Goodhart, English Contribution to the Philosophy of the Law (1948) 24.
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stitre decisis. These things ought to be fully explored, perhaps, for a
complete inquiry into the subject of the law and modern business life;
but I want to limit myself here to commenting on the legislative and
judicial functions only insofar as they can be contrasted to that of the
corporation counsel.
Courts, of course, are concerned primarily with what has already
happened. Litigation involves accomplished facts and, generally, existing law. Yet, as Cardozo pointed out on a number of occasions,
even within this limitation, there is room for judicial consideration of
changes and of trends: "The principle.., does not change," he said,
"but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever
the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be." 2
Those of you who are familiar with Brandeis' Social and Economic
Views will remember his example: "The change in the law by which
strikes once illegal and even criminal are now recognized as lawful
was effected in America largely without the intervention of legislation.
This reversal of a common law rule was not due to the rejection by
the courts of one principle and the adoption in its stead of another,
3
but to a better realization of the facts of industrial life."
I make this passing reference to judicial recognition of social
and economic changes now, because it may very well occur to you a
little later that much of what I have to say about the duties of corporation counsel has more to do with a priori adjudication than with
a posteriori advocacy. You may conclude that the corporation counsel
spends more time judging the wisdom of a perfectly lawful action
before it is undertaken than in defending it afterwards. This I would
not deny. Indeed, I propose to demonstrate, if I can, that in dealing
with those problems of a corporation involving conflicting interests,
the exercise of a function that is judicial in nature is an essential
of the corporation counsel's role.
In some cases, the nature of the conflict in interest may be such
that corporation management may find it impossible or inappropriate
to resolve the conflict. Such a situation seems to have arisen with
respect to employees who may be national security risks. Any responsible management recognizes, of course, a dear duty to protect and
preserve our national security. Compliance with requirements developed by the Department of Defense and similar agencies is as conscientious and thorough, at Ford, for example, as human effort can
make it. This involves compliance, not only with the regulations
2

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. io5o (1916).
'Brandeis, Social and Economic Views (193o) 113.
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relating to the mechanical methods of protecting our defense secrets,
but also those relating to the personnel having access to them. It is
not here that the principal problem arises. The question is one of
generally screening employees, or job applicants, for so-called "security
risks."
We know enough of subversion to realize that there is a serious
danger entailed in the employment of persons of particular affiliations
in tasks intimately associated with our national defense. At the same
time, there is an obvious obligation to the individuals concerned to
ensure fair treatment. A discharge or refusal to hire for security reasons
can follow a man to an extent that is almost the equivalent of blacklisting, and thus destroy his ability to earn a livelihood.
There are certain types of government contracts that prohibit the
employment of individuals specified by the appropriate government
agency as security risks. Here, of course, the burden is not ours. The
determination is by the government, and our responsibility, like that
of good citizens generally, is in attempting to ensure, first, that government processes are fair, and second, that they are respected. But the
problem becomes more direct and acute, for us, when no such government requirement or determination exists. On the one hand, it would
seem that some action should be taken to protect our national welfare.
Indeed, there is evidence that failure to take such action would subject
us to just criticism. At the same time, it would seem that such action
should only be based upon appropriate fact-finding and, even then,
upon application of appropriate standards to the facts. There must be
standards as to what constitutes a "security risk" and then a method of
fair hearing to determine whether the facts of a particular case satisfy
those standards.
This is an undertaking that seems inappropriate for private enterprise, although at present the burden is to a substantial extent cast
upon it.
I have digressed on this point so that you might see a specific
situation where, in the absence of adequate legislation, counsel must
perform a function that is judicial in nature, based upon the facts
available and with the public interest as his major criterion.
You will see, also, I hope, that there is a relationship between the
concern of the legislator and that of the corporation counsel. While
the judge generally is involved in how established facts square with
established law, the legislator is involved in the constant adjustment
of the laws to the facts and needs of life. If he is responsible he must
be equally cautious that the law does not lag too far behind or venture
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too far forward. His business is the laws that are to be written, and his
purpose is to keep them useful for the advancement of all those elements in a society that make for general progress, security and happiness.
The business of a good corporation counsel, in some measure, is to
see to it that some laws are not written-not written because they
never become necessary. And so, the legislator-with varying degrees of
enthusiasm-resorts to law-making to adjust the activities of corporations to the public interest. Corporation counsel, on the other hand,
if he is worth his salt, guides his corporation's activities so that they
concur with the public interest to such an extent that legislative intervention is unnecessary. He is, therefore, ahead of judgments and
ahead of legislation. And in this sense he is the custodian of corporate
freedom.
This may sound as though I put a strain on the role of the corporation counsel. Before spelling it out more thoroughly therefore, I
would like, very briefly, to summarize the conditions of corporate
freedom.
I do not need to tell you generally in what ways the corporation
today is restrained from acting the way a corporation did in the 192o's,
or in what ways the corporation of the 192o's was restrained from
acting like the corporation of the i8go's. It is sufficient for our purpose
to recognize that there is a great difference in corporation behavior
from generation to generation.
These changes have all resulted from changes in the dimensions of
the area of freedom in which the corporation exists. This area, at the
beginning of the rise of the modern stock corporation, really was not
defined at all, except in the application of the general principles of
the law to the affairs of corporations and in the arrival over the years
at some legal formalisms on structure and competence. Soon, however, it became clear that what the corporation did, in an increasingly
complex economy, could have profound effects on other entities and
other people far removed from it. And it became a wholly natural
object of legislative attention, because public opinion concluded that
legislation was essential.
Thus far, there is nothing unique about this in the history of AngloSaxon jurisprudence. In a democracy the law begins with conclusions.
Although these conclusions are not always clearly articulated, they invariably are recognizably expressed. Sometimes they are expressed
only in a popular uneasiness such as that which preceded the enactment of the Sherman Act in 189o. In fact, despite all the applications
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of the Sherman Act, the Act itself still does nothing more than lay
down the very broad popular conclusion that conduct deemed unreasonably to restrain or monopolize trade is against the public interest and therefore is illegal. The particular meaning of the Act has
never been constant, and there is no reliable body of precedent in
judicial interpretation that can be relied upon with confidence in the
face of changing economic facts.
To what extent then does the Sherman Act really restrict the
freedom of the business corporation? It has been on the statute books
now for sixty-six years. And yet we know very well that in those years
there has been an extraordinary range of differing degrees of freedom
allowed to the corporation. In effect the Sherman Act has worked only
as a kind of enabling resolution, allowing the judges-in the particular
economic and social climates of their particular days-to apply the
brakes to a course or trend of conduct that-in its context-looked
unhealthful. The meaning of the law here is derived, not from the
definition of what is good, but rather from a felt need somewhere to
achieve relief. There is no philosophic innovation in this. Locke
sensed it as early as 1687, when he said: "...what determines the
will... is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view, but
'4
some... uneasiness a man is at present under."
This leaves us with the need to rely upon our own insight and
wisdom in evaluating that uneasiness, in finding out what creates
it, in appraising its true extent, in searching its validity and in determining whether it is really there or is being whipped up for some
reason. Because we can be certain, in the long history we now have
of judge-made law in this field, that such enactments 4s the anti-trust
laws are going to serve as springboards for the courts, and not as
fences. Anti-trust laws in America are never in a state of being: they are
constantly in a process of becoming. You can never close the book and
say that now we know what we cannot do. Different circumstances
will bring forth a sequel almost before you know it. "The view of
any statutory construction or rule of law as a closed book never was
anything but purely theoretical pedantry," said Ehrlich. "Juristic
science has never been able to offer prolonged resistance to great and
justifiable social or economic needs...."5
For example, prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
'Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Fraser ed. 1894) bk. 2,
c. 21 at 332.
'Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of the Law (Moll's transl.
1936) 430.
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government anti-trust suit against the Aluminum Company of America, in 1945,6 the courts had held in a number of cases that the exclusion of competition, actual or potential, was a necessary element of
the offense of monopolizing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. But,
as you know, the Court held otherwise in the Aluminum case. It held
that the mere possession of the power to monopolize, coupled with an
intent to exercise it if necessary, is sufficient alone to violate the Act.
In this brief allusion to the Sherman Act, I want to suggest that
you can look successfully for no moral absolutes in the laws controlling business activities. What is good and constructive and useful in
one decade under one set of circumstances may somehow, under different conditions ten years later, turn out to be sufficiently repulsive
or destructive to occasion new constructions of the law that once
held the action to be perfectly proper. The standard of reference,
then, is not alone what the law says, but the total environment that
will give color and character and significance to the act. This leads
us directly to the real nature of the responsibility of the modern corporation counsel.
At the beginning of this discussion, I pointed out that there is as
much of the judicial function attached to the corporation counsel as
there is of advocacy. I also referred to corporation counsel as the custodian of corporate freedom. I would like now to bring these two
thoughts together, and then proceed, by way of example, to show
you in what kinds of cases counsel is called upon also to serve as a specie
of house philosopher. This happens sometimes when there is not only
no question of law involved, but when there is not even the prospect of
legislative inquiry.
To begin with, the present-day corporation counsel stands not
on the periphery of the democratic process, as he did in the last half
of the nineteenth century, but in its dead center.
The democratic process is a continuing and sensitive series of
rising pressures and inevitable responses. As a major element in our
capitalist democracy, the corporation occupies a unique place. It has
a personality that can be credited or blamed; but unlike the individual,
it has very little margin for error because it is without any inherent
value. It is valuable only insofar as it serves people. It cannot, therefore, behave quite as cavalierly as individuals can, because if it makes
a mistake, and certainly if it repeats a mistake, something will happen sooner or later to ensure that it never makes the same one again.
0
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. and,
1945.).
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Pressures will rise to police it tighter, to impose new regulations, to
restrict it in new ways, sometimes to punish it. And the response will
come through the courts, through the legislatures, through labor
unions, through consumers-through all the means available for the
people in a democracy to express themselves.
Between the rising pressures and the inevitable responses stands the
corporation counsel. His job is to contribute creatively, constructively
to keep them in pace, to forestall pressures that are overwhelming
and to foresee responses that are crippling. He is not a partisan. He
is on the side of the corporation's growth and survival, but he cannot
afford to stand on the platform, "my company right or wrong." If he
does, his corporation will not grow and may not survive.
For growth and survival, in political and economic institutions as
well as in the natural world, a certain area of freedom is prerequisite.
In a democratic society, that area is defined by no rigid rules, because
the areas all overlap. It may be, therefore, that the liberty that you
give one man restrains another-as, for example, in some kinds of
boycotts and work stoppages or in rebate concessions. Here the arbitrator is really public tolerance. If there is sufficient popular concern
about an episode or a course of conduct on the part of a corporation,
it will sooner or later find expression in governmental action through
administrative agencies, the courts or the legislatures, and it will take
the form of curtailing the freedom of the corporation. Now there is not
much point in the corporation 'at that late stage shrieking protests
that it is being abused. By that time there is little that can be achieved
by advocacy, however skilled and eloquent counsel may be. Obviously,
the way to prevent increased curtailments of the corporation's freedom
is to avert the rise of pressures to which the curtailments are a response.
I have put all this so far in generalities. This is because, in the first
place, I wanted to indicate that, when you deal with corporation law
in a complex industrial society such as ours, you are dealing with the
whole society and not just a part of it; and in the second place, because
there is a general principle of freedom involved and not just the
isolated interests of a single business or industry.
Yet, just as our judicial system is litigatory, proceeding through
cases, our whole society and especially corporations move forward
through events-through things that are done-and not just ideas
that are expressed. Tempting as the assignment might be, no corporation counsel of whom I know has yet been hired solely for the purpose
of philosophizing generally to elevate the corporation's board of directors. His judgments, like those of the courts, spring more from
experience than from orderly syllogisms.
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This experiential factor, as opposed to one strictly legal, can be
well illustrated by practices followed in dealing with patents in my
own industry. The principal source of development with respect to
the products and methods of manufacture at Ford comes, of course,
from our own engineering staff, a staff that is specifically employed to
make such developments. As a matter both of implied contract7 and
also, in our Company as in most companies with large engineering
staffs, as a matter of express contract, any invention or new idea that
may be conceived becomes the property of the Company. Large research and development facilities and staffs could not be maintained
if each employee became the owner and patent-holder of any discovery
that he might make. The common law recognized this fact to such an
extent that even in the absence of an express agreement, and even
though the employee may not have been employed specifically for
development work, the employer has the right to make use of discoveries that are made on employer's time and with his facilities.8
Most employers, though, will consider such development in determining the employee's salary advancement, and some will give
special recognition to unusually creative work through bonus systems.
But many developments are made outside the organization. One
source, tremendous in quantity although meagre in quality, is through
unsolicited disclosures. At Ford we receive hundreds of such disclosures
or offers of disclosure each year, although only a very small fraction of
one per cent are novel and have any real merit. The principal problem is to avoid the risk of creating latent liabilities while at the same
time giving courteous treatment to these suggestions. Many of them
are from customers, the maintenance of whose good will requires that
they be accorded fair consideration. There is no feasible way of preventing the suggestions from coming in, or of screening them in advance so that we look at only those of merit. At the same time, the
frequency of suits alleging use of an idea confidentially disclosed attests
to the risk of accepting unconditionally such disclosures. In such suits
the Company is put to the burden of contesting the novelty or value
of the idea, at best. But it is in a particularly difficult position if an unsolicited disclosure contains an idea on which at the time the Company's own engineering staff happens to be working.
So far as possible, therefore, we at Ford try to specify the rights of
the parties in advance. In the case of an offer of disclosure, we reply
that we would be glad to consider it provided the discloser executes
7E.g., National Development Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N. E. (2d) 783 (1943).
'E.g., Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 15o F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1945).
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the usual confidential disclosure form. The form provides that the
disclosure gives rise to no rights to Ford to use the idea, on the one
hand, and, on the other, that it creates no additional right or remedies
for the individual beyond those to which he may be entitled under
the patent laws. If the initial letter makes the disclosure, of course,
this method is impossible. In such a case we usually return the letter
and say that we cannot submit it to the appropriate department for
study unless the form is executed.
When a worthwhile idea does come along, we enter into negotiations with a view to buying or taking a license to use the idea. And,
I might add, we do not necessarily confine our negotiations to ideas
that have such novelty and utility as to be patentable. While we must
necessarily limit with strictness our potential liability in the face of the
multitude of disclosures that continually are being made, we apply
a much more flexible approach where an idea in fact appears to have
merit.
A third source of development for an individual member of any
industry is, of course, through the efforts of competitors. Practices in
this regard vary from industry to industry. In some, advances by each
member are guarded jealously against competitors. In others, there is
rather extensive interchange of developments through cross-licensing.
There has been a trend toward the latter practice, particularly during the past twenty years. 9 To some extent, this has been the direct or
indirect result of decisions under the anti-trust laws.
In many industries, however, new patents are no longer of such fundamental nature as to be of great significance to any competitor and
often are of transitory utility. Particularly in those industries of large
mass-producers, profits depend so significantly upon design, manufacturing and sales considerations that patentable innovations often
are of relative insignificance. Even in the 1930's, when restrictive
patent practices were common in various industries, liberal crosslicensing arrangements were found to exist in the automotive industry.
These gave to the public the benefit of technical advances by whomever made.' 0 While there is at present no such formal agreement in
the industry, most automobile manufacturers have been satisfied in
recent years with two or three years of exclusive rights on a patent
property, and have been willing then to license the patent at nominal
royalty rates or royalty-free.
This is not to say, of course, that our patent laws embody undesir"Cf. Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).

"See Testimony of Edsel Ford, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee (1938) pt. 2, 256-285.
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able policy, or that it is not to the benefit of society to encourage inventions by granting to the inventor a right, limited in time, to the
exclusive use of his invention. In many fields, particularly that of the
small manufacturer of components, the patent laws provide worthwhile incentives. But here again the corporation counsel does not advise his company with reference only to the existing law. He must
take into consideration those factors that, in the experience of his
company and his industry, indicate doing more than the bare minimum
legally required. For it is this kind of foresight that preserves the
corporation's freedom.
In his continuous function of avoiding trouble ahead, i.e., further
restraints on corporate freedom, the corporation counsel is especially
alert to three major means through which those restraints can take
form and become effective. One is the introduction of new legislation.
Another is the addition of new restrictions or new areas to contractual
relationships. And a third is the elusive process by which unorganized
public opinion, while taking no formal expression, nevertheless effectively stigmatizes a corporation as just not being allied with the
public interest.
On far less general problems than that, it is possible for a sufficient
degree of restlessness to occur to precipitate a crisis in corporate freedom. It is not necessary for the general public to be uneasy or perhaps
even aware of the problem. A relatively small segment with a common
interest can send up the age-old cry, "There ought to be a law." But
often when you get into the matter, you will find that more will be
risked by the proposed law for one group than will be achieved for
another. Indeed, it is quite possible that one segment of an industry
will be hurt by remedial legislation that shows promise of relieving
another segment of the same industry.
A corporation's freedom is subject, as I have suggested, to restraints other than those expressed in public laws. In order to be
able to retain what it needs to operate efficiently, a corporation must
restrain its own freedom of action in some particulars. Otherwise it
risks the imposition of more severe statutory restraints in the future.
An alert corporation counsel constantly should be seeking to learn the
direction in which society is moving. Today's aspirations are reflected
in tomorrow's law; and no counsel wants his corporation limping
along, surly in protest, bringing up the rear in those constantly changing frontiers in human relationships that give the law its flexibility.
Let me emphasize that counsel has a determining voice here, and
a highly creative part to play, because there is an opportunity for
him to give guidance and point to future laws. Consider, for example,
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a general situation that has developed in this country since the First
World War. Its full significance was not wholly realized until after
the Second World War. With the decline in great personal fortunes and
the steady increase in taxes, the historical sources of financial support
of important private educational and charitable activities were in
great measure being gradually shut off. Large or even adequate individual gifts were becoming more and more infrequent. A notable
void was becoming apparent in our social structure in areas where
government support was either impossible or undesirable. The continuance and strengthening of these traditionally privately supported
activities were not only essential to the economic, social and physical
health of our society but indirectly at least to the life blood of the
corporations themselves.
Yet if the corporation had moved in to help fill the void, an immediate conflict might have arisen between the corporation's stewardship of
shareholder's money and its responsibilities as a citizen. The problem
involved both the proper extent and the proper range of contributions to essential activities in the local or national communities. The
corporation counsel cannot satisfy an imaginative and responsible
management simply by pointing out limitations. He must construct an
affirmative policy that will win the approval of the public and of
the shareholders and, if a test comes, of the courts.
Where does he begin?
The common law established an insufficient guide for resolving
the problem: a corporation gift for charitable or educational purposes
was proper only if it appeared to result in some direct and proximate
benefit to the corporation or tended reasonably and directly to promote its purposes. 11 Stated with such generality, of course, the rule
had little meaning, and specific content had to be sought from the case
law.
A lawyer for a corporation even thirty years ago certainly would
have advised that his client should be conservative in making donations. The principle tended to receive a restrictive application at common law. Between 188o and igoo, for example, there were decisions in
various jurisdictions holding it ultra vires for a corporation to make
donations for religious or school facilities for employees and their
families, or for projects such as international festivals even if they
1
Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contribute to Charity (1949) 85 Va. L.
Rev. 401, 423; Note, Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires (1931)
31 Col. L. Rev. 136.
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would tend to increase the number of the corporation's customers 12
While there was some evidence that a more liberal view was emerging 13 the case law was at best conflicting, and at worst positively restrictive.
Despite the restrictions, or at least the uncertainty, of the common
law as to corporate philanthropy, corporations were subject to increasing pressure, both from within and without, to recognize a charitable responsibility. In the face of uncertainty and risk in the light
of outmoded common law decisions, our corporations responded to
these pressures. While no responsible corporation management consciously undertook, I think, to exceed its authority under applicable
legal rules, there is no question that corporation counsel resolved the
uncertainties of the common law rules in favor of as liberal a construction of the permissive limits as possible. They went as far as they
reasonably could. And they would have gone farther, I think, had
there been reliable legal precedent to support them. The problem
became one of clarifying and modernizing the law.
Here I think the corporation counsel played a major role in advocacy. Test cases were instituted and skillfully argued. Policy statements to shareholders were carefully drafted. Legislatures were urged
to liberalize the laws to conform to new realities.
And many of the legislatures responded. More than half of the
states now have statutory provisions authorizing corporate donations
for general charitable purposes. While in some cases they seem merely
to restate the common law rule, many others go much further and
purport to permit such contributions without regard to business purpose. 14 Questions have been raised as to whether such statutes can
be constitutionally effective as to previously organized corporations.
That issue was litigated in the now famous A. P. Smith case 15 in
New Jersey. There it was held that subsequent liberalizing legislation
of this type does not violate the shareholders' right of contract. While
there may be some question, in the light of the opinion in the Smith
case, as to just how far the New Jersey statute expands the powers
of corporations to make donations for general educational purposes, 16

"See, e.g., In re Branksea Island Co., i Meg. 12 (1888); People ex rel. Moloney
v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill 125, 51 N, E. 644 (1898); Davis v. Old Colony
R. R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881); Tomkinson y. South-Eastern Ry., 35 Ch. D. 675 (1887).
"See Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 N. Y. Misc. 43, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1896).
uSee, e.g., Mich. Gen. Corp. Act § io(k); Del. Corp. L. § 122(9); N. Y. Gen. Corp.
L.§ 34.
5A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N. J. 145, 98 A. (2d) 581 (953).
"The decision of the Smith case, insofar as it bears on guides for corporate
giving, may be summarized as follows: a corporation may make a charitable dona-
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the approach of both the statute and the court was clearly an attempt
to relax the common law "direct benefit" rule.
While state legislatures were thus adding liberalizing amendments
to their corporation laws, corporations amended their charters accordingly, and Congress acted to amend the tax laws to remove the
tax penalty on donations. The Revenue Act of 1936 added what is
now known as Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, permitting
corporations to deduct up to 5 per cent of net income for charitable
contributions.
The result has been a tremendous burgeoning of corporate philanthropy. From a total of thirty million dollars in 1936, corporation
giving has grown to nearly half a billion dollars a year. The measure
of the significance of these figures is readily apparent from the fact that,
since 1944, recorded charitable contributions by corporations in this
country have exceeded in each year the total collections of all community chests in the United States.
In the face of liberalizing legislation apparently broadening the
scope within which corporations properly may engage in philanthropic
activities, and with the ever-increasing pressure in fact to broaden such
activities, the need for policies to guide the exercise of judgment in
such affairs has become even more urgent.
Here the corporation counsel is not being asked to move ahead of
management, but only to keep abreast of it and to guide it. This is a
matter primarily of keeping constantly in sight the broad picture, of
understanding the general trends of our society. Management itself
is exposed to that society in a hundred different ways, and a good
management wants to move with it. The corporation that is aware of
the opportunities, and not merely the obligations, of citizenship wants
to go beyond what it is required to do, legally or by other pressures,
because corporations cannot live on a day-to-day basis. Any major
corporation needs a reservoir of good will. A reservoir of good will is a
sufficient body of people who will resent unjust attacks on the corporation because they know something of the direction in which it is
moving, and they approve. Consequently, modem management is
watchful of any reasonable opportunity to extend the responsibility
of the corporation as a citizen. Counsel has a determining voice here,
and a highly creative part to play.
These examples of the corporation counsel's activities and enlarged
tion when (i) it is not made to further personal ends, (2) it is not excessive in
amount, (3) it is made to a worthy cause, (4) it will aid the public welfare, and (5)
it will advance the donor's interests (a) as a private corporation and (b) as part
of the community in which it operates.
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interest point to the recognition of the major fact in his professional
life. That fact is that where once he functioned as an expert in the
law as it affected corporate behavior, he must now be a constant
and sharp-sighted student of the trends of society as a whole. He
must recognize the social nature of his corporation-that it is something more than a legal fiction by which a group of managers operate
a business for a large number of absentee owners. 17 It would be good
for the perspective of every corporation lawyer to consider, as Professor Berle has done in his recent book, what might happen if a modern
large corporation were suddenly, by act of the state, court decision,
or in some other fashion deprived of its supposed legal existence:
"... a moment of astonishment might affect the minds of its
directors, officers, employees, customers, creditors, and so forth.
But one imagines that the instantaneous reaction would be one
of mild amusement-like that pictured in a famous cartoon
showing a workman at the top of a vast dam bellowing through
a microphone to a workman at the bottom of it that the dam
had been declared unconstitutional. The dam would still be
there-and so would the corporation. Clearly it is not the law,
with its fiction of juristic personality, that supplies the life blood
and beating heart of these vast mechanisms. If the law, acting
through some instrumentality, declared that they did not exist,
the entities would be found to be not fictitious, but factual.
The railroad would go right on running. The mail order house
would continue to ship to its customers. The steel company
would continue to transport ore and process it into steel. The
men grouped in these concerns would continue to do what they
were accustomed to do. The community would still look to them
for supply. Buyers from them would continue to pay their bills.
Sellers to them would continue offering their wares. Plant executives would go down to the office as usual.... In vain would
some lawyer complain that the directors could no longer fix
policy, or the president give orders.... The huge machine
would keep right on rolling. This is of the essence of an institution, and not of a legalistic creation."' 8
We in America do not live in a doctrinaire society in which new
laws are normally enacted without regard to facts and realities. The
law-making process is slow and, on the whole, pretty well integrated
with the play of events on public opinion. So it becomes necessary for
modern management to consider how the facts and realities in a
corporation's affairs will square with the public philosophy, with the
values of the total national community and its sense of where it is
'7Cf. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1932) 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1145, ii6o.
18Berle, The 2oth Century Capitalist Revolution (1954) S8.
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headed. This is not just a matter of what is legal or illegal or doubtful today; it is at the very root of the problem of the area of freedom
that the corporation will have tomorrow.
If corporation counsel is to serve his company effectively then, he
will find himself deep in an extra-legalistic judicial activity. But his
standards of reference are broader than the statute books or the
opinions of the courts. In recent times the lawyer too often has been
no closer abreast of society than the present state of the law itself,
which necessarily always lags behind. This is something with which
some practitioners can still content themselves. But any corporation
counsel worthy of his trust must anticipate the popular judgments
that lead legislators to make new laws and judges to hit upon new
interpretations of old ones.
This is not to imply that counsel should be a weathervane entirely
subservient to the popular view, or that he should follow a quixotic
line. There will be occasions when he will be constrained to take an unpopular position-when he will advise his client to stand squarely on
its rights under the law. And any lawyer worthy of the name will not
hesitate to fight ill-founded claims or unreasonable demands; and he
will avoid counselling the easy road of appeasement. But his client's interests will not be well served by advice that ignores the deeper aspirations of his time.
The point I want to make is that the court and jury that concerns the corporation counsel today is not sitting on an isolated case
in a single courtroom. It sits as a perpetual grand jury with powers
just as sweeping. It sits continuously across the land; and with the
speed of modem communications it can get and appraise the evidence
very rapidly indeed.
To deal with this great force, counsel must be judging constantly
the pace and direction of progress of the free society in which his
company exists. His constant observation and appraisal of the new
ideas of conduct, as they become current, must be sound. His estimate
of their real vitality as opposed to their temporary spurts of liveliness
must be wise and objective.
In the practical terms of his own company's affairs, this means
that counsel judges his company's actions before they are undertaken,
in relation to their possible contribution to a new need or to a public
clamor for a new law.
This is, of course, a function of the highest political order. But
after all it is the same function embraced two centuries ago by lawyers
like John Adams and Josiah Quincy, and a few generations later by
Webster and Clay. And just as these men were shapers of law in days
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when political relationships formed the major domestic preoccupation of the nation, the corporation counsel should be a shaper of
laws today when economic relationships form a major domestic preoccupation of our society. And the quality of his advice-his real effectiveness-will be just as good as the quality of his broad judgment
and the depth of his insight into the world around him. Nevertheless,
for better or for worse, he will affect the growth of corporation law and
set the broad terms under which our future economic life will be
conducted.
And so the corporation counsel of today, if he is to live up to the
challenge of his new responsibilities, will shun the kind of advice that
is motivated by a desire to preserve the rubrics of a vanished era; he
will be alive to the social, economic and political implications of
the time; he will avoid a narrow, shortsighted approach to his corporation's problems; he will have the courage to advise against a
business program or device which, although legally defensible, is in
conflict with the basic principles of ethics. Failing this, he not only will
be ignoring his obligations to his profession, he will be doing a disservice to his company, which may find itself in the position of winning a legal battle but losing a social war.

